In November 2004 CIP noted that, “the State Department’s reasons for keeping Cuba [on the list] do not withstand the most elementary scrutiny.” That remains the case today, especially given that Cuba is hosting peace talks between Colombian rebels and that country’s government. While there are still some members of the Basque organization (ETA) living in Cuba, none are involved in terrorist activities – indeed, on January 10, 2011 ETA declared a permanent cease-fire.

As for the public renunciation of terrorism, Cuba has done so on a number of occasions, including most recently when it sent condolences both to the American people and the U.S. government over the bombings in Boston. And years ago Cuba signed all UN denunciations of terrorism.

Keeping Cuba on the terrorism list undermines the list’s validity and usefulness. As Juliette Kayyem of the Boston Globe put it on April 29, “to treat a nation as a terrorist threat when it is not, we so dilute the term that it matters little to the countries we hope to isolate.” After waiting many years for an administration to do the right thing, many of us hoped the Obama administration would remove Cuba from the list. We are still hoping.

If you were unable to attend the conference, you have the opportunity to catch up on the subjects discussed in Tampa by following this link: http://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/rapprochement-with-cuba

            Cuban Americans under 40 are driving the change in outlook, but many older Miami Cubans agree it’s time for a new policy.  The Cuban American Washington visitors were born in Cuba and (with one exception) left in the 1960s and 1970s, and last week they came to make the case to Congress. Legislation to lift the embargo is highly unlikely in this Congress, but the Obama Administration can significantly alter policy through administrative action—and start discussions with the Cuban government.  Our group urged legislators to give the President the political space to do so, and to let him know he has it.

            Actions that the President can take that would improve relations with Cuba include removing Cuba from the state sponsors’ of terrorism list, easing travel to the island by permitting all “purposeful” travel with a general, rather than specific, license, and loosening financial requirements for agricultural sales.  Myriad other bilateral issues, including the incarceration of USAID contractor Alan Gross, could likely be negotiated as a package if the White House would only sit down and talk.

            Coincidentally, the Cuban-American visit overlapped with that of well-known Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, who spoke on Capitol Hill and at several other Washington venues.  Though under no illusion that the blogosphere will bring democracy to Cuba, she said it’s helping to open “cracks in the wall of censorship.” She advocated lifting the U.S. embargo, in part to remove the “first and foremost excuse for everything.”  “I doubt the government could continue to function without it,” she said.

But until now, the U.S. has taken the position that it will take no step to improve relations with Cuba until Alan Gross, the USAID contractor  imprisoned for “actions against the Cuban state, ” is released.  The Cubans needless to say would expect some quid pro quo and hint that the U.S. should in return release the Cuban Five. The release of all five is unlikely, however, especially as one, Gerardo Hernandez,  however unfairly,  is in for life for “murder,” accused of having been involved in the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes in 1996 (though there is not a shred of evidence against him).

Some U.S. officials have given the impression that the Cuban position is set in stone, that the U.S. must release all five or there is no deal. A Johns Hopkins delegation in Cuba recently, however, found this not necessarily to be the case. Cuban officials with whom we spoke indicated that even the question of an exchange for Gross is certainly open to negotiation.

And what of Alan Gross himself? He is certainly not innocent of any wrongdoing, as the U.S. maintains. He was distributing sophisticated communications equipment in clear violation of Cuban law and memos that have surfaced make it clear that he was working (however unsuccessfully) to undermine the Cuban government.  But there is no blood on his hands and he is guilty on no heinous crime.

There is no reason, in short, that imaginative diplomacy and negotiations could not lead to the release of Alan Gross and open the road to improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba. And certainly this is in the interest of the U.S., given that its present Cuban policy is rejected by the rest of the world and leads nowhere.  Every year when the vote on the U.S. embargo comes up in the UN General Assembly, the vote is overwhelming. One or two tiny island nations in the Pacific may vote with us, and always Israel. But however it votes, Israel is one of Cuba’s most active trading partners. It votes with us but it too rejects our policy. We are alone.

None of this is reflected in President Obama’s statement of January 30 suggesting that Cuba is living in the past and should change. But in fact it is changing. Some 52 years have passed since we broke relations with Cuba. It is no longer the ally of the Soviet Union. It is no longer trying to overthrow other governments in the hemisphere and thus now has diplomatic relations with all of them. And it is moving toward a more open economic system. The world has changed, as has Cuba. Only our policy remains frozen in time. It is long since time to change it. And we could certainly do more to encourage Cuba in the right direction through engagement rather than continued efforts at isolation.

And perhaps there is hope. In his January 30 statement, President Obama said that he could foresee improved relations during his second term if Cuba meets him half way.

And Josefina Vidal, a senior Cuban Foreign Ministry official, replied that the U.S. could “count on the willingness of the people and government of Cuba to work to advance bilateral relations.”

Let us hope they both mean what they say.

Wayne S. Smith was the Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (1979-82) and is now an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C.

If only that had been the case. In fact, he had been distributing sophisticated communications equipment in clear violation of Cuban law. According to an Associated Press article dated Feb 12, 2012, Gross described his activities as “very risky business.” They must have been for he was being paid almost $600,000 for his efforts! The same article also reports that he was using a special SIM card during his last trip to Cuba – a device intended to keep satellite phone transmissions from being pinpointed, and normally available only to CIA and Defense Department personnel and sometimes to those connected with the State Department. And no wonder he had one. Gross was employed by Developmental Alternatives Inc (DAI), which had a multi-million dollar contract with USAID to operate in Cuba under a program called for by the Helms-Burton Act to promote democracy, i.e., to bring about regime change. The Cubans considered the program subversive.

As for the suggestion that Gross was just distributing cell phones to an isolated Jewish community, Adela Dworin, the president of Cuba’s largest Jewish community organization, has denied any link to Gross and stated that the Jewish community “does not need any of the sophisticated equipment that Gross allegedly introduced in Cuba; we have a completely legal internet.”

That certainly has been my experience. The Jewish community in Cuba is extremely well organized and has long had excellent internet connections, with one another and with groups outside Cuba.

If it is the U.S. Government’s position that any improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations depends upon Gross’ release, what steps has the U.S. taken to bring that about? What quid pro quos has it offered? None that I can see. And yet, improving relations with Cuba is (or should be) of marked importance to the U.S. for our Cuban policy is condemned by the rest of the hemisphere. The U.S. is the only country in the Americas not to have full diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. And the majority of other governments have said that unless Cuba is invited to the next Summit of the Americas they will not attend, and thus there will be no Summit. How embarrassing for us.

Clearly, it is in the interest of the U.S. to improve relations with Cuba, and yet, as we have orchestrated it, the first step must be a solution to the Gross case, i.e., that he be freed. But, as indicated above, there seems to be no effort on our part to bring that about.

The Cubans have hinted that in return for Gross, we should free the Cuban Five. But that is a non-starter. At least at this stage in the game, it would be unacceptable to the American public. Five for one would be seen as unbalanced, and, also, one of the five was convicted (however unfairly) of murder and is serving a double life sentence.

But while an exchange for the Five would not work – at least at this point – , a reduced variation might. One of the five has already been released on parole (though not allowed to return to Cuba) and another is due out shortly. Why not speed up his release by a few months and allow both to return to Cuba, in return for Gross’ release. And if we need to sweeten the pot a bit, we could remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the so called terrorist list. Cuba should long since have been removed anyway. There has not been any act on its part in years to keep it there and there is a growing popular demand for its removal. So let’s do the right thing and at the same time help bring about Gross’ release.

And these are by no means the only quids that might bring about his release. There are a number of others, if we would but turn our minds to it. One way, for example, would be for the State Department and USAID to suspend any further programs “to promote democracy in Cuba” that do not follow normal diplomatic protocol and have host country authorization. And we would lose almost nothing in the process, for these programs “to promote democracy” have achieved very little in terms of changing public opinion in Cuba. Indeed, as some have said, they have been almost as useless as TV Marti.

(This is not the place to take it up, but as we move toward normalization with Cuba, we must at some point take up and put the case of the Cuban Five in its proper legal and historical context. A separate IPR which points in that direction was published by the Center for International Policy in June of 2010 and is available from CIP. An updated version is now under production.)

The UN vote is not the only evidence of the United States’ total isolation on the issue of Cuba. We are the only country in the Western Hemisphere that does not have normal diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. The only one. More than anything, our Cuba policy is an embarrassment. It avails us nothing. Certainly it does not force the Cubans to adopt policies or attitudes more to our liking. After all these years that should be evident. On the contrary, as it isolates us, our policy if anything strengthens Cuba’s determination to defy us. We could accomplish far more by easing tensions and beginning a dialogue.

The political winds have shifted. The Cuban-American vote in Florida was closer in the recent election than it has ever been, with either Romney or Obama winning the majority of the Cuban-American vote, depending on the poll you reference. Will the Obama administration respond to those new breezes in the next term? Let us hope so. If not, more years of embarrassment for no logical reason at all.

Property damage reportedly was also heavy, with many homes and buildings destroyed or severely damaged.

According to press reports, the first planeload of UN relief supplies arrived from Panama on November 8. Many more reportedly will follow.

Khrushchev, however, insisted on sending the missiles in secret. The problem was that it was not really feasible. The United States’ U-2s flew overhead frequently. There was no way to get the missiles unloaded at the dock, moved to the launching sites, assembled and readied for firing without being detected.

Raising suspicions even more was the fact that the Soviets, including visiting Foreign Minister Gromyko, kept insisting they only had defensive weapons in Cuba, which the Americans could now see was not true. Kennedy had said all along “the gravest issues would arise” should any missile deployment occur. Despite Soviet denials, it was clear such a deployment had taken place, prompting some action by the United States On October 16, Kennedy convened a group of some 15 or 16 senior advisers, later known as ExComm, to decide what to do. By the end of the week, ExComm had come to two alternatives. The first was a naval quarantine to prevent the Soviets from delivering additional military equipment. The second was an air strike, almost certainly to be followed by an invasion of Cuba.

The debate reached the bottom line when Kennedy asked General Sweeney, head of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, if his forces could destroy all of the missiles in Cuba. The General responded:

“We have the finest air force in the world. If we can’t do the job, nobody can. But can I say there is no chance that one or two missiles and nuclear warheads might still be operational, and can still be fired, after the attack? No Mr. President, I can’t say that.”

Wisely, the President decided on the naval quarantine, which was announced on Oct. 22 and went into effect on October 24.

On the evening of October 26, President Kennedy received a message from Khrushchev. Long and rambling, it ended with an acceptable proposal if the U.S. would guarantee it would not invade Cuba, Khrushchev would withdraw his missiles from the island.

But, early on the morning of October 27, a second message arrived, which others, probably hardline advisors, had obviously had a hand in drafting, adding the proviso that the U.S. should also withdraw its missiles from Turkey.

Advised by Llewellyn Thompson, the former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Kennedy decided to ignore the second message and announce his acceptance of the first. The world, he believed, would welcome the fact that the crisis seemed to be over. And it did.

And how fortunate that it did end, as the Joint Chiefs were recommending an air strike on October 29 to be followed shortly thereafter by an all-out invasion. For his part, Fidel Castro had always believed that Cuba would be invaded. And if that happened, he had advised Khrushchev that he should not hesitate to launch missiles. It would be the end of Cuba, but with an invasion, that became inevitable. The whole thing could have ended in a catastrophe, and not just for those immediately involved. As Robert McNamara noted glumly at a conference in 1992: “It would have ended, I believe, in utter disaster, not only for Cuba, but for the Soviet Union, my own country, and the rest of the world.” The world, then, must be eternally grateful to Kennedy and Khrushchev for reaching a sensible solution that avoided the chaos that might have been.

These reflections come from a conference hosted by Wayne Smith and Harry Blaney of the Center for International Policy. For Harry Blaney’s reflections click here Cuban Missile Crisis: Lesson for Today on Nuclear Diplomacy.

The new regulations do, however, raise some interesting questions for the United States. One result almost certainly will be that there will be more Cubans arriving on our shores. In past years, under what has been called the “wet foot, dry foot policy,” any Cuban who reached our soil could be paroled in, i.e., could stay. Will that remain the case after January 14? State Department officials say they are studying the matter carefully.

There will be some increase, yes, but we are not facing a crisis here, as we did, say, during the Mariel sealift. Some hard-line Cuban-Americans are suggesting we should already slam the doors. That would be foolish – and unnecessary.  This is an eminently controllable situation – and one which should result in an improved situation – and perhaps even in an improved atmosphere.

He almost has it backward. The U.S. is now the only country in the Western Hemisphere not to have diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. In that sense, we, not Cuba, are now isolated. And over a number of years now, the vote in the UN General Assembly to condemn our embargo against Cuba has seen the great majority voting to condemn, and only Israel and sometimes one or two tiny countries (obviously after U.S. largesse), voting in favor. And Israel, it should be noted, may vote with us, but it is one of Cuba’s most active trading partners. In other words, it votes with us but ignores our policy.

According to a white paper issued by Romney on January 25, U.S. travel restrictions on Cuban-Americans were loosened as part of Obama’s “appeasement strategy” toward the Cuban government. But the Romney folks had – and have – that one all wrong. The controls were eased not to appease the Cuban government, but as a gesture to the Cuban-American community, the majority of whom want to travel to see their families on island and want to be able to send them money. We’ll see how they react to being told that were Romney elected, they’d have to go back to the days of George W. Bush when they could travel only every three years and remit only limited amounts of money to those families.

Interesting to note also that at the last Summit of the Americas in April of 2012, our Cuba policy was roundly condemned by virtually all other hemispheric governments, who made it clear that if we stick to barring Cuban attendance, there would be no more summits, for they, the other governments, would not participate.

In his January 25 white paper, Romney also swore to adhere strictly to the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, including implementation of Title III. But Helms-Burton has been on the books now for some 15 years. It’s had little effect on the Cuban government and wouldn’t have any more under Romney than under, say, George W. Bush, which is to say, none. Title III has never been implemented, not even by George W. Bush, and never will be. It is so utterly extraterritorial in nature that it isn’t implementable. We would all look forward to seeing the Romney team give it a try.

Romney also vowed on January 25 to “break the information blockade” by ordering “the effective use” of Radio and TV Marti. Good luck. TV Marti is effectively blocked. Radio Marti has been on the air for years but has little listenership, not for technical reasons, but because, as one Cuban put it: “the programs all seem to be made ‘for and by’ a Miami audience.” That doesn’t seem likely to change, whatever the technical instruments employed.

Romney on January 25 also vowed to seek ways to hold the Castros accountable for the shoot-down of the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft back in 1996, leading to the death of four Cuban-Americans. A worthwhile objective perhaps, but in fact so much pie in the sky. It will play well in Miami, but isn’t likely to achieve anything